

GOVT 510: American Government and Politics

Fall 2015 - Robinson Hall B 442; T 4:30-7:20 PM

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Course Description:

This course provides a broad introduction and overview of the academic study of American government and politics. The course is designed for both PhD- and Masters-level students, with varying requirements for each degree. This is a survey course, but we can not cover all seminal and contemporary approaches to studying American politics. Yet, by the end of this course, students will have a basic familiarity with the debates, controversies, methodologies, and approaches to studying American politics by political scientists. Political science is a diverse discipline and, despite the instructor's intellectual biases, this course will expose students to myriad epistemologies and different analytical points of view. In particular, we will cover both institutions and behavior — the two major subfields in American politics — as well as issues in public policymaking; and we will examine research that is theoretical and empirical, quantitative and qualitative.

This is a core course for political science MA and PhD students and it should be the foundation for successful completion of the PhD qualifying exam in American Government and Politics. In addition, for those wishing to specialize in this field, this course should assist you in identifying your own research topic and specialty. For such majors, this course should be supplemented by field seminars, including: GOVT 603: Seminar in the Courts and Constitutional Law; GOVT 604: Seminar on Congress and Legislative Behavior; GOVT 605: Seminar on the Presidency; GOVT 706: Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations; and field electives in more specialized topics.

Note: *There are different requirements for MA and PhD students. Please read these requirements carefully.*

Course Goals:

By the end of this course, each student should be able to:

- Understand and evaluate classic and theoretical works on American politics
- Understand and evaluate empirical political science research

PhD students should be additionally prepared to:

- Study for the PhD qualifying exam in American Government and Politics
- Develop and design original empirical research on a topic in American politics

Course Requirements:

This course is a seminar and individual class sessions will be discussion-based. Although the instructor will spend some time during each meeting introducing the material and perhaps clarifying technical aspects of the readings, the primary purpose of our meetings is for student-led critique and discussion of the required readings. Given the nature of the course, the readings are at times numerous and detailed.¹ If you find that you are having trouble keeping up with the readings, feel free to contact the instructor for advice. In addition, you may wish to coordinate with other students for help with collective notes, which are encouraged especially for students planning to take the PhD qualifying examination in American Government and Politics.

A necessary requirement for this type of course is that students *attend every class*. Absence from more than one class – unless a student has a *documented emergency* – is considered unacceptable. With each absence past the first, a student may be penalized a letter grade, and will be encouraged to drop the class. Work commitments, vacation, and travel are *not* documented emergencies, and if these conflict with class, you should strongly consider dropping and taking the course when it better fits your schedule. In addition, any absence must be reported to the instructor prior to the beginning of class.

The following are components of the requirements for ALL students in this course:

- *Class Participation* is required to make the seminar run smoothly. Students should read all of the required readings and think about them before arriving to a class meeting. Please see the companion notes on successful participation posted in the Dropbox folder containing the course readings. Participation includes both raising and responding to questions regarding the readings and being attentive to the thoughts and criticisms of fellow participants. Advanced graduate students need not be coerced into engaging the literature and fellow seminar participants. Discussions, while focused on criticism, will remain constructive and productive throughout. **15%**
- To facilitate the desired levels of participation, each student is responsible for individual or cooperative *Seminar Leadership*. **Twice** during the semester (once in the first half, and once in the second half), a student will be required to type up a 4-5 page *synthesis* of the

¹You'll notice that there are many "required" books. These are all essential bookshelf material for PhD students, but I understand that it might be financially burdensome to purchase all of these books, especially all at once. I have thus placed all books on 4-hour reserve at the Fairfax library. You may also coordinate to share copies of books amongst yourselves. But, please plan ahead. All required readings must be completed by the day of assignment. "I didn't have the book" is never a valid excuse for not reading required material.

week's readings and at least 10 key questions for discussion and submit these materials to the class by 5 PM the Monday before class. These materials are to be emailed to the instructor, who will then post them for the rest of the class to see. This student (or students – some weeks will have more than one seminar leader) will also prepare a 10-15 minute introduction to the topic's readings at the beginning of class, which the instructor will augment as needed. Your synthesis and the discussion questions you develop should explore the themes and controversies in the literature about the topic, and raise questions for discussion about how that week's theoretical approaches fit the broader scope of the course. Please see the "Participation Guidelines" handout. **15%**

- *Reading Summaries* — Each student is required to write 6 short reading summary papers throughout the semester. These will be due at the beginning of class and pertain to that day's required readings. Reading summaries should be 1 page long and should succinctly summarize 2 of the week's required readings. Each summary must include the following sections:
 - *Research Question*: state the main question the research seeks to answer
 - *Theory*: state the author's causal explanation for their empirical findings, or what they think might appropriately answer the research question
 - *Hypotheses*: restate the author's primary expectations, if applicable.
 - *Method*: describe the means by which the author assesses the main hypothesis. What method is used?
 - *Results*: describe the main finding of the test and the concluding inference the author draws to answer the research question.

There are 12 weeks beyond our first meeting, so you will be writing these summaries for half of the class periods. You may *not* submit a reading summary on a class period where you are seminar leader, so this limits your flexibility somewhat. You may, however, write a summary of our Capitol Hill Day experience (see below, this will take place on 10/23, as a special class in Washington, DC). The Capitol Hill Day summary will be due on 11/3, along with any summaries on the "Lobbying and Interest Groups" readings. These are due at the beginning of class and late reading summaries will not be accepted. **25%**

- Each student is required to complete an *Assessment of Course Readings* (due 12/11). This informal assessment should specify a) those readings that have been especially useful and reasons why, b) those readings that should be dropped from future versions of the course and why, and c) what you have read outside of this course that should be added to this syllabus. Completion of this assessment will earn you **5%** of the final course grade.

In addition to those components mandatory for all students, students must choose (by Friday, September 25) whether they wish to write a **research design** OR take **midterm and final examinations**. Political Science PhD students **are required** to take the "research track," but MA and MPA students can choose between that option and an "exam track." Once an MA or MPA student chooses either to take exams or write a research paper, they cannot, under any circumstances, change to the other track. The following are components of the two separate "tracks":

- **Research Track (required for PhD students)**

Choose a research question in American politics, broadly speaking, and complete an original research design meant to address your chosen question. The final product should take the form of a conference paper/journal article, but without the actual empirical research. Your paper should be between 15 and 18 pages in length. For the design, you must pose a unique and appropriate political science research question that is properly motivated, use the literature of the field to develop theoretical expectations about a relationship, and pose a suggested course of collecting and analyzing data that would allow a researcher to evaluate the question. In your conclusion you can speculate about findings, but you do not need to perform the research. The paper will be due in several stages:

- *Friday, September 25* (by 5:00 pm in my mailbox, or via email): Research Proposal. First, you will complete a 1-page introduction that states a thesis, or research question, and provides a basic outline of your paper.
- *Friday, October 30* (by 5:00 pm in my mailbox, or via email): Literature Review and Bibliography. 4-7 pages for the literature review. As many bibliographic references as you'd like to add, but certainly enough to fill out the literature review.
- *Friday, November 27* (by 5:00 pm in my mailbox, or via email): Hypotheses and Description of Data. 1-2 pages of hypotheses, derived from the existing literature. 3-5 pages describing which data/evidence you would use to test these hypotheses. These can be qualitative or quantitative in nature.
- *Wednesday, December 8*: Final Research Design due.

The research design is due in multiple stages, but will be graded holistically, taking into consideration the quality of the intermediate submissions, at final submission. **40%**

- **Exam Track**

For this option, you will be required to complete take-home midterm and final examinations. For each assessment, you will be required to answer two (out of a pool of more than that) questions in 5-7 pages per question. You will be expected to refer primarily to the literature covered in the course, but you can use outside sources if you wish. The exams are open books and open notes, so your answers should be well thought out and written intelligently. You will not be allowed to work collaboratively on these exams. The following are the dates for the exams:

- *Midterm Exam* will be distributed in class on October 6 and will be due a week later, by 7:20 pm on October 13 (There is no class this day, but the exam will be due via electronic submission). **20%**
- *Final Exam* will be distributed in class on December 8 and will be due a week later, by 7:20 pm on December 15. **20%**

Grade Distribution:

<i>Class Participation</i>	15%
<i>Seminar Leadership</i>	15%
<i>Reading Summaries</i>	25%
<i>Assessment of Course Readings</i>	5%
<i>Research Design/Exams</i>	40%

Required Books:

Cox, Gary W., and Matthew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives*. Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press

Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Howell, William G. 2003. *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Mayhew, David R. 2005. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990*. 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Sinclair, Betsy. 2012. *The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Topics and Schedule of Readings

The following is a *tentative* schedule for the course. Updates to this schedule may be emailed and communicated in class, as appropriate. This schedule is meant to give you a sense of the topic(s) to be covered on a given day. It is also meant to guide you if you wish to complete readings ahead of time. You are required to have read the assigned reading by the week listed below.

Part I. Classics

Week 1 (9/1)

THE FOUNDERS AND FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Required

- Alexis de Tocqueville. 1835. *Democracy in America*. Volume I, Chapters 3-8. The library has a digital copy you can use: <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/georgemason/detail.action?docID=10726062>
- Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison. N.d. *The Federalist Papers*. Nos. 10, 14, 39, 46-49, 51, 70, 78. Available at: <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fedpapers.html>
- Kenyon, Cecilia M. 1955. "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government." *The William and Mary Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History* 12 (1): 4-43.
- Smith, Rogers M. 1993. "Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 549-566.

Recommended

- *The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union*. 1781.
- *The Constitution of the United States of America*. 1788.
- *Anti-Federalist Papers*.
- Bailyn, Bernard. 1967. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Bense, Richard F. 2000. *The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hartz, Louis. 1991. *The Liberal Tradition in America*. 2nd ed. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Hofstadter, Richard. 1948. *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made it*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1974. "Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many." *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (1): 1-26.
- Key, V.O. Jr. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: A. Knopf.
- Stillman, Richard J. 1982. "The Changing Patterns of Public Administration Theory in America." In *Public Administration History and Theory in Contemporary Perspective*, ed. J.A. Uveges. Marvel Dekker.

Week 2 (9/8)

WHO GOVERNS? POWER AND POLICY

Required

- Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapters 1, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 19-28.
- Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Chapters 1-4, 8.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-2.

Recommended

- Almond, Gabriel A. 1988. "The Return to the State." *American Political Science Review* 82 (3): 853-874.
- Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1962. "Two Faces of Power." *American Political Science Review* 56 (4): 947-952.
- Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock. 1962. *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Lowi, Theodore. 1969. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- McConnell, Grant. 1966. *Private Power and American Democracy*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Moe, Terry M. 2005. "Power and Political Institutions." *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (2): 215-233.
- Riker, William H. 1982. *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, & Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Stigler, George J. 1975. *The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Especially chapters 7-8.
- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Especially through chapter 3.
- Walker, Jack L. 1966. "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 60 (02): 285-295.

Part II. Institutions

Week 3 (9/15)

CONGRESS

Required

- Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 62 (1): 144-168.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1977. "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration." *American Political Science Review* 71 (4): 883-917.
- Grimmer, Justin, Solomon Messing, and Sean J. Westwood. 2012. "How Words and Money Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Effect of Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent Credit Allocation." *American Political Science Review* 106 (4): 703-719.

Recommended

- Adler, E. Scott, and John S. Lapinski. 1997. "Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3): 895-918.
- Arnold, Douglas R. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes." *American Political Science Review* 82 (2): 405-422
- Binder, Sarah A. 1996. "The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1991." *The American Political Science Review* 90 (1): 8-20
- Cooper, Joseph, and David W. Brady. 1981. "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn." *American Political Science Review* 75: 411-425.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Dion, Douglas. 1997. *Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew: Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Dodd, Lawrence C., and Richard L. Schott. 1986. *Congress and the Administrative State*. New York: Macmillan.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1966. *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Gilligan, Thomas, and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. "Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature." *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (2): 531-564.
- Grimmer, Justin. 2013. *Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why it Matters*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, Richard L. 1996. *Participation in Congress*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kiewiet, Roderick, and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Miller, Warren E., and Donald W. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 57: 45-56.

- Polsby, Nelson W., and Eric Schickler. 2002. "Landmarks in the Study of Congress Since 1945." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 333-367.
 - Poole, Keith, and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
 - Rohde, David W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
 - Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast. 1981. "Structure-induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice." *Public Choice* 37 (3): 503-519.
 - Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." *The American Political Science Review* 81: 85-103.
 - Sinclair, Barbara. 1997. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U. S. Congress*. Washington: CQ Press.
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Week 4 (9/22)

THE PRESIDENCY

Required

- Neustadt, Richard E. 1960. *Presidential Power*. New York: Wiley. Chapters 1, 3-5.
- Howell, William G. 2003. *Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-5.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice, William G. Howell, and David E. Lewis. 2008. "Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the Two Presidencies Thesis." *Journal of Politics* 70 (1): 1-16.
- Berry, Christopher R., Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell. 2010. "The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending." *American Political Science Review* 104 (04): 783-799.

Recommended

- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. *Who Leads Whom Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2004. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 690-706.
- Cameron, Charles M. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Howell, William G., Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski. 2013. *The Wartime President: Executive Influence and the Nationalizing Politics of Threat*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kernell, Samuel. 1993. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Lewis, David E. 2003. *Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Moe, Terry M. 1985. "The Politicized Presidency." In *The New Direction in American Politics*, ed. John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
 - Mueller, John. 1973. *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*. New York: Wiley.
 - Rudalevige, Andrew. 2002. *Managing the President's Program: Presidential Leadership and Policy Formulation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
 - Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Week 5 (9/29)

BUREAUCRACY

Required

- Wilson, James Q. 1989. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. New York: Basic Books. Chapters 1-2, 4-5.
- Weber, Max. 1946. "Bureaucracy." In *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Heinrich Gerth. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Introduction, Chapters 1-2, Conclusion.
- Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. "Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (Apr.): 330-345.

Recommended

- Allison, Graham. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 63 (3): 689-718.
- Carpenter, Daniel P. 2004. "The Political Economy Of FDA Drug Review: Processing, Politics, And Lessons For Policy." *Health Affairs* 23 (1): 52-63.
- Cohen, Michael, James March, and Johan Olsen. 1972. "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17: 1-25.
- Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking Under Separate Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2007. "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (4): 873-889.
- Hecl, Hugh. 1977. *A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaufman, Herbert. 1960. *The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lewis, David E. 2003. *Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lewis, David E. 2008. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureau-*

cratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Lindblom, Charles E. 1959. "The Science of Muddling Through." *Public Administration Review* 19: 79-88.
 - McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 3 (2): 243-277.
 - Moe, Terry M. 1984. "The New Economics of Organization." *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (November): 739-777.
 - Moe, Terry M. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In *Can the Government Govern?*, ed. John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
 - Moe, Terry M. 1990. "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy." In *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond*, ed. Oliver E. Williamson. New York: Oxford University Press.
 - Moe, Terry M. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In *Can the Government Govern?*, ed. John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
 - Miller, Gary. 1993. *Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
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Week 6 (10/6)

THE COURTS

Required

- Dahl, Robert A. 1957. "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker." *Journal of Public Law* 6: 279-295.
- Rosenberg, Gerald N. 1991. *The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Chapter 1.
- Segal, Jeffrey A., and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. *The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3, 8.
- Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 2000. "Field Essay: Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead." *Political Research Quarterly* 53: 625-661.

Recommended

- Bartels, Brandon L. 2009. "The Constraining Capacity of Legal Doctrine on the Supreme Court." *American Political Science Review* 103: 474-95.
- Bailey, Michael, and Forrest Maltzman. 2008. "Does Legal Doctrine Matter: Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court." *American Political Science Review* 102: 369-384.
- Black, Ryan C., and Ryan J. Owens. 2009. "Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence." *Journal of Politics* 71: 1062-75.
- Cameron, Charles M., Albert D. Cover, and Jeffrey A. Segal. 1990. "Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model." *The American Political Science Review* 84 (Jun.): 525-534.

- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2003. "Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (Apr.): 205-214.
 - Clark, Tom S., and Benjamin Lauderdale. 2010. "Locating Supreme Court Opinions in Doctrine Space." *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (4): 871-890.
 - Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1998. *The Choices Justices Make*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
 - Maltzman, Forrest, James F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 2000. *Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
 - Moraski, Bryon J., and Charles R. Shipan. 1999. "The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices." *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (Oct.): 1069-1095.
 - Segal, Jeffrey A., and Albert D. Cover. 1989. "Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme Court Justices." *American Political Science Review* 83: 557-565.
 - Shapiro, Martin M. 1982. *Who Guards the Guardians?* Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
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Week 7 (10/13)

COLUMBUS DAY BREAK – NO CLASS

Week 8 (10/20)

INTERBRANCH RELATIONS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

Required

- Mayhew, David R. 2005. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990*. 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 2-3.
- Binder, Sarah A. 1999. "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96." *The American Political Science Review* 93 (3): 519-534.
- Shipan, Charles R. 2004. "Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence." *The American Political Science Review* 98 (Aug.): 467-480.

Recommended

- Aberbach, Joel D. 1990. *Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Bailey, Michael, Brian Kamoie, and Forrest Maltzman. 2005. "Signals From the Tenth Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making." *American Journal of Political Science* 49: 72-85.
- Balla, Steven J., and John R. Wright. 2001. "Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (4): 799-

812.

- Bergara, Mario, Barak Richman, and Pablo Spiller. 2003. "Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28: 247-280.
- Cameron, Charles M. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2003. "Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (Apr.): 205-214.
- de Figueiredo Jr., Rui J. P., Tonja Jacobi, and Barry R. Weingast. 2008. "The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, ed. Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman. Oxford University Press
- Kriner, Douglas, and Liam Schwartz. 2008. "Divided Government and Congressional Investigations." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 33: 295-322.
- Martin, Andrew D. 2001. "Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers." *American Political Science Review* 95: 361-378.
- McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (Feb.): 165-179.
- Parker, David C.W., and Matthew Dull. 2009. "Divided We Quarrel: The Politics of Congressional Investigations." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34: 319-345.
- Rivers, Douglas, and Nancy L. Rose. 1985. "Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 183-106.
- Segal, Jeffrey A. 1997. "Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts." *American Political Science Review* 91: 28-44.

Week 9

10/23 (Friday) — Capitol Hill Day. 9:00-1:00PM

Gold Room (2168), Rayburn House Office Building

No class on Tuesday, 10/27.

Part III. Back to Power and the Nature of Government

Week 10 (11/3)

LOBBYING AND INTEREST GROUPS

Required

- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapters 5-6.

- Walker, Jack. 1983. "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America." *American Political Science Review* 77: 390-406.
- Hall, Richard L., and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." *American Political Science Review* 84(3): 797-820.
- Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." *The American Political Science Review* 100 (1): 69-84.
- Esterling, Kevin M. 2007. "Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees." *American Political Science Review* 101 (01): 93-109.
- Hojnacki, Marie, David C. Kimball, Frank M. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, and Beth L. Leech. 2012. "Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence: Reexamining Interest Group Research." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 379-99.

Recommended

- Ainsworth, Scott, and Itai Sened. 1993. "The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(3): 834-866.
- Ainsworth, Scott. 1993. "Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence." *Journal of Politics* 55 (1): 41-56.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Boehmke, Frederick J. 2002. "The Effect of Direct Democracy on the Size and Diversity of State Interest Group Populations." *Journal of Politics* 64: 827-844.
- Boehmke, Frederick J. 2005. "Sources of Variation in the Frequency of Statewide Initiatives: The Role of Interest Group Populations." *Political Research Quarterly* 58 (4): 575-585.
- Caldeira, Gregory A., Marie Hojnacki, and John R. Wright. 2000. "The lobbying activities of organized interests in federal judicial nominations." *Journal of Politics* 62 (1): 51-69.
- Gray, Virginia, and David Lowery. 1995. "The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or the Natural Regulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 1-29.
- Hansen, John Mark. 1985. "The Political Economy of Group Membership." *American Political Science Review* 79: 79-96.
- Key, V. O. 1964. *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*. New York: Crowell.
- Kollman, Ken. 1997. "Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional Committees." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (2): 519-544.
- Kollman, Ken. 1998. *Outside Lobbying*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Querubin, Pablo, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2013. "The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850-1880." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8 (4): 409-450.

Week 11 (11/10)

PARTIES

Required

- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1-2.
- Cox, Gary W., and Matthew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives*. Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press. Chapters 1-3, 10-11.
- Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapter 1-5.

Recommended

- American Political Science Association. 1950. *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*. Washington, D.C.: APSA. Summary of Conclusions and Proposals, and Part I (through pg. 36).
- Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (1): 35-30.
- Chiou, Fang-Yi, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 2003. "When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (Jul.): 503-522.
- Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (Apr.): 235-266.
- Noel, Hans. 2014. *Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 1998. "Macropartisanship: A Replication and Critique." *American Political Science Review* 92: 437-466.
- MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1989. "Macropartisanship." *American Political Science Review* 83: 1125-1142.
- McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. "The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress." *The American Political Science Review* 95 (Sep.): 673-687.
- Miller, Warren E. 1991. "Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting: Back to the Basics." *American Political Science Review* 85: 557-568.
- Miller, Gary, and Norman Schofield. 2003. "Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 97: 245-260.
- Patty, John W. 2008. "Equilibrium Party Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (3): 636-655.
- Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Snyder Jr., James M., and Tim Groseclose. 2000. "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (Apr.): 193-211.
- Snyder, Jr., James M., and Michael M. Ting. 2002. "An Informational Rationale for Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 90-110.
- Wolbrecht, Christina. 2000. *The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change*.

Part IV. Behavior – How do *Individuals* Interact with Government?

Week 12 (11/17)

PUBLIC OPINION & IDEOLOGY

Required

- Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter. New York: Free Press.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-6
- Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. 2013. "How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation." *American Political Science Review* 107 (57-79).
- Jacoby, William G. 2014. "Is There a Culture War? Conflicting Value Structures in American Public Opinion." *American Political Science Review* 108 (4): 754-71.

Recommended

- Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 1998. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." *Journal of Politics* 60: 634-652.
- Achen, Christopher. 1975. "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response." *The American Political Science Review* 69: 1218-1231.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2008. "The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting." *American Political Science Review* 102: 215-232.
- Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Stanley Feldman. 1981. "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications." *American Journal of Political Science* 25: 617-645.
- Carpini, Michael Delli, and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Druckman, James N. 2004. "Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects." *American Political Science Review* 98: 671-686.
- Feldman, Stanley. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 32: 416-440.
- Lenz, Gabriel S. 2012. *Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians' Policies and Performance*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Page, Benjamin I., Robert Y. Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey. 1987. "What Moves Public Opinion?" *American Political Science Review* 81.
- Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1992. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stimson, James A. 1995. "Opinion and Representation." *American Political Science Review* 89: 179-183.

- Stimson, James A. 1998. *Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings. 2nd Edition.* 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
 - Wright, Gerald C., Jr. Robert S. Erikson, and John P. McIver. 1987. "Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American States." *American Journal of Political Science* 31: 980-1001.
 - Zaller, John R. 2012. "What Nature and Origins Leaves Out." *Critical Review* 24 (4): 569-642.
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Week 13 (11/24)

PARTICIPATION + ELECTIONS

Required

- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter.* New York: Wiley and Sons. Chapters 1, 6-7.
- Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." *The American Political Science Review* 62: 25-42.
- McDonald, Michael P., and Samuel L. Popkin. 2001. "The Myth of the Vanishing Voter." *American Political Science Review* 95 (4): 963-974.
- Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1980. "The Two Faces of Issue Voting." *The American Political Science Review* 74: 78-91.
- Sinclair, Betsy. 2012. *The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1-3, 6.

Recommended

- Burden, Barry C., David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer, and Doanld P. Moynihan. 2014. "Election Laws, Mobilization, and Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (1): 95-109.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper and Row.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.* New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Wiliam G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008. *The American Voter Revisited.* Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1992. "Peasants or Bankers: The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy." *American Political Science Review* 86: 597-611.
- Nickerson, David W. 2008. "Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments." *American Political Science Review* 102 (1).
- Rogowski, Jon C. 2014. "Electoral Choice, Ideological Conflict, and Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (2): 479-494.
- Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America.* New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Squire, Peverill, Raymond E. Wolfinger, and David P. Glass. 1987. "Residential Mobility and Voter Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 81 (1).

- Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
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Part V. Representation and Policy

Week 14 (12/1)

REPRESENTATION

Required

- Eulau, Heinz, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson. 1959. "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke." *American Political Science Review* 53 (3): 742-756.
- Miller, Warren E., and Donald W. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 57: 45-56.
- Lax, Jeffrey R., and Justin H. Phillips. 2009. "Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness." *American Political Science Review* 103 (3).
- Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes'." *Journal of Politics* 61 (3): 628-57.
- Anzia, Sarah F., and Christopher R. Berry. 2011. "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 478-93.
- Broockman, David E. 2014. "Distorted Communication, Unequal Representation: Constituents Communicate Less to Representatives not of their Race." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (2): 307-21.
- Trounstein, Jessica. 2010. "Representation and Accountability in Cities." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 407-423.

Recommended

- Achen, Christopher H. 1977. "Measuring Representation: Perils of the Correlation Coefficient." *American Journal of Political Science* 21: 805-815.
- Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura, and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 65-76.
- Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" *The American Political Science Review* 90 (4): 794-812.
- Chen, Jowei, and Jonathan Rodden. 2013. "Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8: 239-269.
- Cox, Gary W., and Keith T. Poole. 2002. "On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call Voting: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (Jul.): 477-489.
- Eulau, Heinz, and John C. Wahlke. 1978. *The Politics of Representation*. Beverly Hills: Sage

Publications.

- Gay, Claudine. 2001. "The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 95: 589-602.
 - Grimmer, Justin. 2013. *Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why it Matters*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
 - Hill, Kim Quaile, and Patricia Hurley. 1999. "Dyadic Representation Reappraised." *American Journal of Political Science* 43: 109-137.
 - Meier, Kenneth J. 1975. "Representative Bureaucracy: An Empirical Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 69 (2): 526-542.
 - Page, Benjamin I., Robert Y. Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey. 1987. "What Moves Public Opinion?" *American Political Science Review* 81.
 - Pitkin, Hanna F. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
 - Schuitt, Sophie, and Jon C. Rogowski. N.d., (forthcoming). "Race, Representation, and the Voting Rights Act." *American Journal of Political Science*.
 - Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "Dynamic Representation." *American Political Science Review* 89: 543-565.
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Week 15 (12/8)

POLITICAL INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL POLICY

Required

- Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 1997. "The Public Consequences of Private Inequality: Family Life and Citizen Participation." *American Political Science Review* 91 (2): 373-389.
- Hill, Kim Quaile, and Jan E. Leighley. 1992. "The Policy Consequences of Class Bias in State Electorates." *American Journal of Political Science*: 351-365.
- Gilens, Martin. 2012. *Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hacker, Jacob S. 2004. "Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 98 (2): 243-260.

Recommended

- Bartels, Larry M. 2010. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Enns, Peter K., Nathan J. Kelly, Jana Morgan, Thomas Volscho, and Christopher Witko. 2014. "Conditional Status Quo Bias and Top Income Shares: How US Political Institutions have Benefited the Rich." *Journal of Politics* 76 (2): 289-303.
- Hacker, Jacob S. 2002. *The divided welfare state: The battle over public and private social benefits in the United States*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Kelly, Nathan J. 2009. *The Politics of Income Inequality in the United States*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilens, Martin. 2000. *Why Americans Hate Welfare*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Additional Concerns

Syllabus

This syllabus is a **tentative** guide for the course. I reserve the right to make announced changes to this document and will distribute these changes in class and on the course website. Each student will be responsible for all announcements and materials covered in class.

Class Conduct

Class atmosphere will be quite relaxed. Just a few guidelines to make sure:

- Arriving a few minutes late is tolerated as long as you make an effort to minimize the disturbance for other students.
- Eating and drinking in class should be reduced to a minimum. It is not forbidden, but please make sure that you are not disturbing others.
- Turn off all cell phones (or don't even bring them).
- No email, IMs, or web browsing on computers during class.
- If you have to leave a class early, please let me know in advance. It is very rude to simply walk out in the middle of a discussion.

Disabilities and Accommodations

Please let me know within the first week of class if you require assistance or special consideration. I can make accommodations for those who need them but must be informed of the need in advance. Any requests for accommodation based on a disability must be arranged through the Office of Disability Services (ODS). <http://ods.gmu.edu/>

Academic Integrity

All work completed in your name must be yours and yours alone. Any work you borrow or ideas you gather from other sources must be cited properly. Please see me if you are concerned about proper citation style. Any attempt to present someone else's work as your own will be met with the harshest consequences. You will receive an F for the assignment and an F for the course. Furthermore, notification of, and supporting documentation for, the violation will be forwarded to the appropriate university administrators.

Enrollment Statement

Students are responsible for verifying their enrollment in this class. Scheduled adjustments should be made by the deadlines published in the Schedule of Classes.

Last Day to Add: 9/8/15

Last Day to Drop: 10/02/15

Please note, after the last day to drop a class, withdrawing from this class requires the approval of the dean and is only allowed for nonacademic reasons. Undergraduate Students may choose to exercise a selective withdrawal. See the Schedule of Classes for selective withdrawal procedures.

Other Useful Campus Resources:

Writing Center

A114 Robinson Hall; (703) 993-1200; <http://writingcenter.gmu.edu>

University Libraries

<http://library.gmu.edu/mudge/IM/IMRef.html>

Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS)

703.993.2380; <http://caps.gmu.edu>

University Policies

The University Catalog, <http://catalog.gmu.edu>, is the central resource for university policies affecting student, faculty, and staff conduct in university academic affairs. Other policies are available at <http://universitypolicy.gmu.edu>. All members of the university community are responsible for knowing and following established policies.