Appendix B: Supplementary Appendix

	Coalition si	$ze \leq 0.95$	Coalition size ≤ 0.75		
	Simple majority	Supermajority	Simple majority	Supermajority	
Final passage votes (N)	973	15,103	313	5,792	
Mean coalition size	.802	.792	.638	.646	
SD	(.128)	(.132)	(.071)	(.065)	
Mean difference	.01	.0	.008		
t-statistic	2.26		2.13		
<i>p</i> -value	.012		.017		

Table B-1: Winning Legislative Coalitions in U.S. States (1999-2000)

Roll call votes are distinguished by whether the state constitution requires a simple majority (AL, AR, IN, TN, WV) or a supermajority (all others) to override a gubernatorial veto. One-tailed t-tests conducted.

	Bills passed with 70% or less			· less	Bills passed with 80% or less			
Independent Variables	(1) DG	(2) DG	(3) UG	(4) UG	(5) DG	(6) DG	(7) UG	(8) UG
Supermajority	.014 (.006)		.0001 (.004)		.014 (.008)		016 (.012)	
three-fifths requirement		.019 (.008)		0006 (.009)		.031 (.011)		013 (.015)
two-thirds requirement		.013 (.006)		.00002 $(.005)$.011 (.008)		(.016)
Majority party size	.067 $(.022)$.067 (0.022)	.003 (.023)	.004 (.025)	.079 (.037)	.078 (.032)	.037 (.034)	.033 $(.038)$
Chamber size (*100)	.044 $(.02)$.045 $(.021)$	(.048)	(.005)	044 (.027)	(.051)	.0002 $(.068)$	$.0006 \\ (.069)$
Legislative professionalism	.055 $(.015)$.053 (.015)	.027 (.011)	.027 (.011)	.089 (.03)	.085 (.025)	.008 $(.009)$.007 $(.011)$
Governor power to call session	.003 (.003)	.003 $(.004)$.00009 (.004)	00006 (.004)	.017 (.006)	.017 $(.006)$	005 (.005)	005 (.006)
Line-item veto	007 (.005)	007 (.005)	.0002 $(.011)$	(.0002)	.005 (.007)	.005 $(.007)$.007 (.013)	.009 (.013)
(Constant)	.562 (.015)	.562 (.015)	.621 (.018)	.621 (.018)	.592 (.024)	.597 (.016)	.658 $(.024)$.658 $(.023)$
N MSE	1861 .053	1861 .053	2705 .049	2705 .049	$3165 \\ .080$	3165 .080	$4566 \\ .075$	4566 .075
Clusters	$\frac{.055}{45}$	$\frac{.055}{45}$.049 42	.049 42	.080 45	.080 45	42	42

Table B-2: Coalition Sizes Across the States (1999-2000), Alternative Thresholds

Entries are linear regression coefficient estimates and standard errors, clustered by chamber-state. The dependent variable is the size of legislative winning coalitions expressed as a percentage of the number of voting members in the chamber. Models 1-2 and 5-6 are for conditions of divided government and models 3-4 and 7-8 are for conditions of unified government.

	Divided government		Unified government		
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Supermajority	.016 (.008)		017 (.016)		
three-fifths requirement		.012 (.01)		019 (.02)	
two-thirds requirement		.017 $(.008)$		018 (.016)	
Majority party size	.075 $(.028)$.079 (.029)	$.055 \\ (.035)$.058 $(.038)$	
Chamber size (*100)	066 (.029)	067 $(.028)$	121 $(.055)$	121 (.055)	
Legislative professionalism	.056 $(.025)$.056 $(.025)$.021 (.019)	.022 (.021)	
Governor power to call session	.014 $(.007)$.014 $(.007)$	006 (.006)	007 $(.007)$	
Line-item veto	001 (.008)	002 (.008)	.009 $(.013)$.008 $(.014)$	
(Constant)	.578 $(.022)$.576 $(.022)$.625 (.029)	.625 (.029)	
N State variance	2527 .00007 (.00005)	2527 .00007 (.00005)	3578 .00004 (.00006)	3578 .00004 (.00007)	
Chamber variance	.00004 $(.00004)$.00003 $(.00004)$.00009 (.00007)	.00009 (.00007)	
Residual variance	.004 (.0001)	.004 (.0001)	.004	.004 (.00009)	
Wald Chi-squared	24.61	25.39	12.13	12.19	

Table B-3: Coalition Sizes Across the States (1999-2000), Multi-level Models

Entries are coefficients from maximum likelihood regression models with random intercepts and random slopes for chamber by state and an unstructured covariance matrix. The dependent variable is the size of legislative winning coalitions expressed as a percentage of the number of voting members in the chamber. To capture only contested votes, we restricted the sample to coalition sizes ≤ 0.75 .

Independent Variables	Divided (1)	government (2)	Unified (3)	government (4)
Supermajority	.126 (.038)	(-)	.032 (.013)	(-)
three-fifths requirement		.085 (.027)		.075 $(.013)$
two-thirds requirement		.126 (.038)		.032 (.013)
Majority party size	.197 (.282)	.197 (.282)	(.103)	205 (.103)
Chamber size $(*100)$	(.010)022	022 (.010)	018 (.016)	018 (.016)
(Constant)	.458 $(.165)$.458 $(.165)$.765 $(.055)$	$.765 \\ (.055)$
N	186	186	193	193
MSE	.059	.059	.062	.062
Clusters	28	28	28	28

Table B-4: Coalition Sizes Across the States on Budgetary Legislation (1999-2000)

Data reflect votes on budget bills in states in which budgetary items required only a simple majority for passage. Entries are linear regression coefficient estimates and standard errors, clustered by chamber-state. The dependent variable is the size of legislative winning coalitions expressed as a percentage of the number of voting members in the chamber. To capture only contested votes, we restricted the sample to coalition sizes ≤ 0.75